A Mont Blanc hófödte csúcsai Russell és Frege vitája a mondattartalomról /
An exchange of nineteen letters between Russell and Frege dating back to 1902 and 1904 reveals a surprisingly intense dispute about the questions of logicism. In this time Russell agreed with Frege on the fundamental aims of logicism. Both claimed that concepts and statements of arithmetic are reduc...
Elmentve itt :
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| Dokumentumtípus: | Könyv része |
| Megjelent: |
JATEPress
Szeged
2007
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| Sorozat: | Bölcsészműhely
Bölcsészműhely, 2006 |
| Kulcsszavak: | Nyelvészet |
| Tárgyszavak: | |
| Online Access: | http://acta.bibl.u-szeged.hu/75712 |
| Tartalmi kivonat: | An exchange of nineteen letters between Russell and Frege dating back to 1902 and 1904 reveals a surprisingly intense dispute about the questions of logicism. In this time Russell agreed with Frege on the fundamental aims of logicism. Both claimed that concepts and statements of arithmetic are reducible to logic. They emphasized emphatically that the meaningfulness of the language of science cannot be explained by simple psychological facts. Beyond this agreement, however, there was a clear difference in their views. Russell argued forcefully that the cognitive content of sentences can be directly represented by singular propositions, whereas Frege insisted on the distinction between sense and reference. According to his conviction, Russell claimed that the logical structure of sentences consists of objects, properties and relations. Frege argued against this claim. He maintained that a sentence contains only modes of presentations of objects. In this paper, I analyse in some detail the epistemological and semantical roots of the Russell-Frege debate and argue that from a contemporary perspective both their views are partly right, partly wrong. |
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| Terjedelem/Fizikai jellemzők: | 141-153 |